The article presents an overview of the collective monograph “Japanese Culture in the West” ed. by Katasonova, E. L. and Dolin, A. A (Moscow: Institute of Oriental Studies of RAS, 2024. 544 p. ISBN: 978-5-907846-81-4). The monograph, for the ¿rst time in the history of Russian Oriental studies, presents a comprehensive interdisciplinary analysis of the spread and inÀuence of Japanese culture on the countries of Europe and America in the 19th – 21st centuries. The reviewer notes that analyzing the experience of “exporting Japanese culture” makes it possible to develop a methodology for transcultural processes, broaden the concepts of cultural authenticity and identity, and propose an alternative to binary models of cultural interaction
The article revisits the policies of Abe ShinzŮ, Japan’s longest-serving prime minister, and places them in the context of the current trend of civilizations advancing as a major factor in international aɣairs. We brieÀy examine the development of the inÀuential concept of a “civilizational state,” today most often exempli¿ed by China, and suggest that this concept can be used to elucidate Abe’s vision of Japanese polity and its position on the global arena. Based on the review of the relevant scholarly literature, we argue that Japan’s traditional selfidenti¿cation as a mediator between Asia and the West also conforms to the idea of a civilizational state. We highlight that the key factor inÀuencing the international situation over Abe’s second administration (2012–2020) was the rise of China in the aftermath of the 2008–2009 ¿nancial crisis, which exposed the West’s relative economic decline. In these circumstances, Japan attempted to assume a position of a mediator between the two poles of power, a position that we relate to Abe’s political aspirations such as his quest for Japan’s greater political autonomy and his appeal both to Asian identity and universal values. In certain respects, this tendency continues after Abe’s resignation in 2020 as well, though whether current and future leaders of Japan will continue with his general approach is a complicated question. We conclude by arguing for urgency of the discussion of the political ideas that mediate between the universal and the local values and identities – a task for which Abe’s legacy appears to us to be particularly relevant.
The article presents a comparative study of the sanctions policy of Japan and the Republic of Korea towards Russia after February 2022 and the assessment of the impact of their sanctions on the development of RussianJapanese and Russian-South Korean cooperation in the Russian Far East. Based on the results of the study of the economic ties of Russia, Japan, and South Korea (in the areas of trade, investment, ¿nance, tourism, and transport) and their interaction in the educational and cultural-humanitarian spheres under sanctions restrictions, the authors come to the conclusion that the sanctions policy of Japan and South Korea towards Russia has a common basis due to their belonging to the “collective West,” and the anti-Russian measures they take are aimed at weakening the industrial and technological potential of the Russian Federation. At the same time, like most of their Western partners, Japan and South Korea are not ready to impose such sanctions that could cause signi¿cant damage to their own economic and strategic interests. There are important diɣerences in the sanctions approaches of Japan and South Korea – Japan pursues a much tougher policy towards Russia, not only limiting exports to Russia, but also imposing a ban on imports of a number of goods from Russia. South Korea is much more willing to maintain ties with Russia and its Far Eastern territories, despite the unfavorable political situation, which is expressed, in particular, in the ongoing oɤcial contacts between Primorsky Krai and Vladivostok and a number of provinces and municipalities of the Republic of Korea. The authors suggest that ties between the Russian Far East and South Korea can be quickly restored once the situation around Ukraine is resolved, while the prospects for restoring relations with Japan look much less certain
This study examines the strategic role of sake as an instrument of cultural diplomacy within the framework of trade relations between Japan and Europe, using a theoretical approach that combines the concepts of soft power, gastrodiplomacy, and nation branding. Sake, as a traditional Japanese fermented beverage rooted in the spiritual and social practices of society, has undergone a reorientation of its function from domestic consumption to a symbol of national cultural identity promoted internationally. Through the Cool Japan policy, the Japanese government actively positions sake as a key element in public diplomacy, linking cultural heritage with export trade strategies. The implementation of the EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) since 2018, which includes geographical indication (GI) protection, provides additional legitimacy for the authenticity of sake in the European market. Promotional strategies involving culinary festivals, cross-industry collaborations, and product narratives emphasizing aesthetic value, origins, and traditional production techniques have successfully enhanced European public perception of sake and, more broadly, of Japan. Export data shows signi¿cant growth, with France, the United Kingdom, and Germany contributing the most, indicating the success of this approach in expanding market penetration. However, this dynamic is not without criticism, including the commodi¿cation of cultural values, exclusion of small producers, and the risk of reducing the spiritual meaning of sake in a commercialized context.
Therefore, this study emphasizes the importance of cultural diplomacy that not only highlights visual appeal and market narratives but also commits to preserving values and the participation of local cultural communities. In conclusion, sake diplomacy offers an intriguing model for the integration of culture and economy in international relations, demonstrating that cultural products can serve as an effective means to build cross-national relations rooted in empathy, experience, and appreciation for the uniqueness of traditions
In the modern world, primarily in developed countries, education has become the main factor of intergenerational social mobility. Sociologists judge the degree of openness or rigidity of the social structure by whether the inÀuence of “birth circumstances” on access to education increases or, conversely, softens. Although higher education has become widespread in Japan by now, this does not mean that the degree of social inequality in this area has decreased. Structuring children’s chances of access to higher education along the lines dividing society into diɣerent social strata begins here at the stage of schooling – ¿rst, in lower secondary school, and then in upper secondary school. The inequality of chances that forms at the stage of school education aɣects the choice of university rank and directions of specialization by children and their parents, employment opportunities in the future, determining, in fact, the entire life path of a person. Based on the works of famous Japanese sociologists and the data of Japanese statistics, the author shows that the Japanese education system plays a dual role. On the one hand, it provides a chance to break away from one’s social roots and move up the social ladder to an increasing number of young people. On the other hand, it preserves and reproduces social inequality. According to calculations by Japanese sociologists, indicators of relative social mobility, reÀecting the ratio of chances to access higher education for people from diɣerent backgrounds, were remarkably stable throughout the post-war period. On the one hand, this does not con¿rm the widely accepted thesis about the growing inequality in education in the last two or three decades. On the other hand, it allows us to assert that both before and now Japanese society is a kakusa shakai, or a gap society. However, the increase of the share of second-generation university degree holders in the structure of Japanese university graduates suggests that the scale of the inÀuence of the factor of social inequality in education will gradually decrease.
The article is devoted to identi¿cation of similarities and diɣerences in the historical memory of Japan and the Federal Republic of Germany after World War II. These issues are a relevant topic for research in the face of the enduring inÀuence of historical grievances on Japan’s relations with its former victims, in contrast to similar relations of Germany. As a theoretical framework, the paper uses O. Malinova’s approach, which interprets historical memory as a product of social construction and a variation of symbolic politics. In addition, the author uses the classi¿cation of historical memory proposed by Matteo Dian. In the scope of the study, the author examines the impact of occupation policies on the further development of historical memory in the two countries. The paper compares the original content of the main narratives of historical memory in each country, the main mnemonic actors promoting them, and the evolution of these narratives from the end of the war to the present day. The author also highlights the reasons for the diɣerences in the content and evolution of the narratives in Japan and the FRG. The author concludes that, despite a certain similarity of the occupation policy in the two countries, as well as the formation of two traditions (conservative and left-progressive) in each country’s historical memory, its content and evolution are substantially diɣerent. In the FRG, the conservative tradition initially included the narratives of self-victimhood and amnesia, while the progressive tradition included the narrative of contrition; over the years however, the traditions have evolved from polarization to a consensus around contrition and elements of self-victimhood. In Japan, the conservative tradition initially included glori¿cation of the past in addition to self-victimhood, i. e., it was more revisionist, while the progressive tradition focused on self-victimhood rather than contrition. Over time, the traditions in Japan shifted from a consensus around self-victimhood to a sharp polarization: progressives moved to a contrition narrative, while revisionists gained ground among conservatives
In Japan, there are many regional legends and traditions associated with water, ¿sh, and fantastic creatures inhabiting the sea. These legends go back many centuries; the ¿rst mentions of large ¿sh are found already in the ¿rst Japanese poetic anthology Man’yōshū (8th century) and in the mythological and chronicle text Nihon Shoki (720). In diɣerent provinces, legends and traditions vary, some motifs are interpreted diɣerently by folklorists, however. Evidently, we can talk about a single body of related texts, united not only by plots where the main characters are whales, dolphins, etc., but also by accompanying actions: matsuri festivals in honor of ¿sh and ¿shing, ritual performance of magical texts, dancing, songs, cooking, making amulets, etc. The symbolism that unites the theme of ¿sh and ¿shing in Chinese and Japanese culture is also obvious: wealth and prosperity, which is reÀected not only in written monuments, but also in works of art. Whales, for example, are associated with numerous legends, traditions, and mythological motifs of local signi¿cance, ideas about these mammals as deities of the sea, to whom Shinto shrines are dedicated. Images of ¿sh were part of oɣerings to the bride’s family due to the auspicious meaning of the item. It is noteworthy that the legends about the sea included famous literary and legendary characters and episodes from famous works of Japanese history and literature, such as Kojiki, Nihon Shoki, Man’yōshū, Heike Monogatari
This research examines the failure of Japanese whale diplomacy following the International Whaling Commission’s (IWC) moratorium on commercial whaling in 1986, with a focus on Japan’s attempts to change the conservationist view of whales to the one focused on consumption of whale meat. This article explains how Japanese whale diplomacy attempts to convince the international public that whaling is part of cultural preservation. The method used is a qualitative approach with analysis of official government documents and research related to Japanese diplomacy and whaling. The constructivism approach was used to analyze how international identities, norms, and discourses shape Japan’s diplomatic policies.
The findings show that, despite Japan’s efforts to prove that whaling is safe and sustainable, it has failed to change international norms on whale conservation. The dominant international discourse continues to regard whaling as unethical and environmentally damaging. Significant resistance from other countries that support conservation was a major obstacle.
This research reveals that the failure of Japanese diplomacy was not only due to international resistance, but also Japan’s inability to align their scientific and cultural arguments with a global narrative that prioritizes environmental ethics. The contribution of this research lies in understanding the dynamics of norms and identities in international relations and the importance of ethical narratives in environmental diplomacy.
The article analyzes the Japanese official narrative about the Northern Territories, which is widespread in Japanese society as a key factor in the formation of the bad image of Russia in Japan. Of particular importance from the point of view of the emotional effect on public consciousness is the thesis that the Southern Kurils are the “ancestral territory of Japan,” that the USSR committed aggressive and unfair actions against Japan during World War II, and modern Russia did not correct them, and that the Japanese natives of the Southern Kurils experience enormous moral suffering, not having the opportunity to freely visit the graves of their ancestors. The article examines the organizational structure of state, public, and socio-political organizations designed to ensure public policy to popularize this narrative and shows the features of its reflection in school textbooks, museums, and memorial complexes. The author focuses on the Movement for the Return of the Northern Territories and the events held within its framework, including the annual “Northern Territories Day,” held on February 7.
It is concluded that, despite all the efforts of the government, Japanese public opinion in reality turns out to be relatively poorly informed about the problem of the Northern Territories. At the same time, as generations change, the interest in this problem is gradually decreasing, especially among young people. There is a process of realizing the futility of maintaining a hard line in the problem, related to visits to graves by former islanders and members of their families, causes the greatest public outcry, but even this aspect, as the results of public opinion polls show, has a limited effect. government’s approach to solving it. The humanitarian aspect of the
In the late 1930s and early 1940s, Soviet-Japanese relations were going through difficult times. The Mongolian issue and border incidents continually worsened bilateral contacts. In a state of hostility and open confrontation, the authorities of both countries detained and rummaged fishing vessels, artificially whipped up spy mania, increased pressure on left-wing elements (Japan) and arrested those who were associated with the enemy side through scientific or other work (the USSR). Limiting himself to two events from Soviet-Japanese history of this time, the author analyzes how Soviet-Japanese relations and the atmosphere of mutual perception changed in the period between the end of the Khalkhin Gol River conflict (1939) and the signing of the Neutrality Pact (1941).
Using reports from employees of the USSR Plenipotentiary Mission in Tokyo as an example, the author examines how Japan’s attempt to begin building “new relations” with the USSR affected the position of Soviet diplomats and influenced the degree and quality of interaction between them and the Japanese.
The period from the end of the Russo-Japanese War to the 1917 October Revolution was a time of political, economic, and cultural rapprochement between Russia and Japan. Moreover, this rapprochement was observed after the events of 1917 for several more years, since, during the Russian Civil War, Japan supported the anti-Bolshevik forces in the Far East.
The two countries entered the First World War as de facto allies; this alliance culminated in the Treaty of 1916. Its reflection in symbolic actions was also an element of this cooperation. In the years before the First World War, and, actually, during the war, hundreds of Japanese servicemen were given Russian awards. The article analyzes the composition of military personnel, what awards and for what merits were presented to the members of the Imperial House who did military service, diplomats, generals, as well as fleet admirals and naval officers, engineers, and divers.
After October 1917, Japan supported members of the White Movement and Admiral A. V. Kolchak for several more years. In addition, even more active support was provided to Ataman G. M. Semenov. For example, Japanese garrisons were stationed in Transbaikalia starting from the autumn of 1918, when he came to power there. Paradoxically, many Japanese officers and enlisted men were presented with Russian awards during the years of the Civil War, which fact is also confirmed in archival documents.
The article is devoted to the problems of Russian-Japanese relations on the Chinese Eastern Railway at the initial stage of its history. Workers from Japan were not invited to build the road, but the Japanese were already among the first settlers in the city of Harbin, founded in 1898 by the Chinese Eastern Railway Society. After a short break caused by the Russo-Japanese War, bilateral relations were quickly restored. In 1906, as the Russian troops withdrew from Manchuria, the Japanese began to return to the Chinese Eastern Railway. Since 1907, Japanese officials, entrepreneurs, cultural and sports figures from Japan began to take an active part in the sociopolitical, economic, and cultural life of the city of Harbin. It was here that the first “Russian-Japanese Society” was created. The Japanese in Harbin were mainly employed in such areas as trade, medicine, entertainment, and domestic service.
An important component of bilateral cooperation was cooperation in the railway sector. Due to the tradition and the inaccessibility of sources, the history of the Japanese population of Harbin is poorly studied in Russian historiography. The purpose of the research is to restore the historical picture and identify the problems of the Japanese presence in Harbin and the Russian- Japanese interaction on the Chinese Eastern Railway in the period between the Russo-Japanese War and the First World War. The study was carried out on the basis of materials from the periodicals of Harbin, with the involvementThe information and analytical materials published in the newspapers Harbinskii Vestnik (Harbin Bulletin), Harbin, Novaya Zhizn’ (New Life), and Man’chzhurskii Kur’er (Manchurian Courier), especially advertising, allow one to get an idea of the composition of the Japanese community, the occupations of the Japanese and some problems of Russian-Japanese relations in 1906-1914. The study of development of the Chinese Eastern Railway by the Japanese, their coexistence and cooperation with the Russians in Harbin will expand knowledge of the history of the Chinese Eastern Railway and achieve a more complete and objective picture of the history of Russian-Japanese relations in the 20th century.