In Poetics 25 (1461b1–3), Aristotle mentions critics who tend to misunderstand the text or read it inaccurately and thus criticise not the actual work, but rather their ideas on it. Some of the extant fragments of Zoilus (4th c. BC), the best-known and the most notorious critic of all the Aristotle’s contemporaries, imply that his critique was sometimes based on misreading and misinterpreting of the text so he could be one of those whom Aristotle meant. This article deals with three fragments attributed to Zoilus (two of them are found in the Scholia to the Iliad, the third one is quoted in Ps. Longinus’ De Sublimitate), each containing criticism towards certain passages in Homer’s poems. On closer examination it turns out that all the inconsistencies Zoilus postulated can be explained, should we read the text more carefully. Hence Zoilus dealt not with what is written but rather with what seemed to him to be convenient for his criticism
The post-Renaissance copies of Aristotle’s Poetics were mostly made for scholarly use. The copyists such as Anton Salvini, a Florentine polymath, librarian and professor of Greek, drew on MSS as well as on printed editions in an attempt to establish the text they could use for translation or academic teaching. Still uncertain remains the rationale of the latest known manuscipts — from the Vatopedi monastery on Mt. Athos (ca. mid 18th cent.) and from Bucharest (of the early 19th cent.). Several similarities these copies display suppose common provenance. The Greek diaspora in Bucharest blossomed around 1800 and Romania is linked to Vatopedi by a long tradition of orthodox learning. The MSS in question provide an overall impression of a schoolwork. The Athoan is of supreme quality while the Romanian often resembles an abstract. The first MS was probably written soon after the foundation of the Athonite Academy near Vatopedi. Aristotle’s Poetics is hardly suitable for monastic learning, but Eugenius Bulgaris who was the headmaster of Athonias from 1753 to 1758 introduced ancient texts into its curriculum: from one of his letters we conjecture that Plato and Aristotle were studied there. It is thus reasonable to suppose that the cod. Vatopedius was made in the Athonias for learning purposes. By 1800 the Academy was in decline but they still taught disciplines and read texts introduced by Bulgaris. So, the Bucarestensis could have been written in the same place. Judging by the composition of the codex its maker was nurturing interest in ancient and modern Greek literature
In the article which serves as a sequel to an earlier one the author argues that Draco’s constitution (DC) in Arist. AP 4 does not derive from an oligarchic political pamphlet in which it served as a prototype of a constitution to be implemented in Athens as the majority of scholars believe. The preponderance of scholars believe, relying on the alleged similarity of DC to the project of the ‘Constitution of Five Thousands’ (AP 30) in 411 BC, that DC emerged in the same ‘moderate’ oligarchic circles as a project of the same kind. Others propose later dates for its appearance but almost unanimously ascribe to oligarchic moderates who pleaded for a ‘hoplite constitution.’ The author argues contra that although DC is not reliable as a historical document, it differs considerably from the known political projects of oligarchs. Its distinguishing features make it anachronistic for conditions of 5th–4th centuries BC, but they are much more at home in the last decades of 7th BC. It is likely that Aristotle found this fictional account in one of the historical sources he used in the AP in which it was fabricated to fill a gap in the lacunose history of the early Athenian constitution and it may have been meant to diminish tendentiously Solon’s contribution, representing the latter as modifying the already existing state order
Hannah Arendt, one of the most significant political and philosophical intellectuals of the 20th century, frequently brought up the issue of power. In The Human Condition, to distinguish power from force, strength, and, particularly, violence, she pointed out that the word ‘power’ had been derived from the Aristotelian conception of δύναμις. Since Arendt had written about power as the capacity to act together in the political realm, her understanding of the term δύναμις was credited to Aristotle. In order to make the distinction between power and its extremity, that is, violence, in Arendt’s theory more comprehendible, it is crucial to examine the Aristotelian conception of the term δύναμις and its original definitions, which are mostly found in Metaphysics. This paper aims to provide a philosophical analysis of δύναμις in Aristotle to clarify Arendt’s notion of power as well as her theory of action. In the first part of the article, the author discusses the word δύναμις which had a variety of meanings in antiquity including power, potentiality, potency, capacity, possibility, and force. Unlike common meanings, Aristotle used the word δύναμις in its relation to the term ἐνέργεια, which were usually translated as ‘potentiality’ and ‘actuality’. Aristotle defined δύναμις as the principle of change, that is, the power or capacity to act and be affected, which reveals itself when it achieves its fulfilment, or ἐνέργεια. In the second part, the author demonstrates that Arendt’s concept of power is based on the Aristotelian δύναμις as the power to act together, which cannot be stored up and exists only in its actualization. The author concludes by saying that power in the Aristotelian sense cannot be substituted for violence but instead manifests itself in the ability to be a political human being