The Gulf War (1990–1991) became a watershed event for Japan’s foreign policy, testing its readiness to address the challenges of the post-Cold War world. However, one can hardly say that Japan successfully passed this test. Despite substantial pressure from the United States and heated debates in the Diet and beyond it, Japan failed to make any contribution to the resolution of the crisis other than providing financial aid. Neither the plan to send peacekeepers to assist the U. S.-led coalition nor the proposal to dispatch JASDF aircraft for the evacuation of refugees were realized. The only “human contribution” Japan made was sending JMSDF minesweeper vessels to the Persian Gulf, but even this was done after the active phase of the hostilities was over. This severely harmed Japan’s image in the world and simultaneously served as stimulus for change, leading to Japan assuming a more active international role from the 1990s on. The present article focuses on the domestic political background of Japan’s reaction to the Gulf crisis. It shows how the factors including the political weakness of the prime minister, factional nature of the ruling party, the situation of the “twisted Diet,” where the LDP did not control the House of Councillors, as well as political opportunism of the opposition, insufficient support for the government’s proposals from public opinion, and the general focus on minor and technical details, rather than strategic foreign policy goals, combined to cause a paralysis of the decision-making mechanism. The study of this historical episode will, among other things, help us to better understand the roots of present-day Japanese foreign policy
The article revisits the policies of Abe ShinzŮ, Japan’s longest-serving prime minister, and places them in the context of the current trend of civilizations advancing as a major factor in international aɣairs. We brieÀy examine the development of the inÀuential concept of a “civilizational state,” today most often exempli¿ed by China, and suggest that this concept can be used to elucidate Abe’s vision of Japanese polity and its position on the global arena. Based on the review of the relevant scholarly literature, we argue that Japan’s traditional selfidenti¿cation as a mediator between Asia and the West also conforms to the idea of a civilizational state. We highlight that the key factor inÀuencing the international situation over Abe’s second administration (2012–2020) was the rise of China in the aftermath of the 2008–2009 ¿nancial crisis, which exposed the West’s relative economic decline. In these circumstances, Japan attempted to assume a position of a mediator between the two poles of power, a position that we relate to Abe’s political aspirations such as his quest for Japan’s greater political autonomy and his appeal both to Asian identity and universal values. In certain respects, this tendency continues after Abe’s resignation in 2020 as well, though whether current and future leaders of Japan will continue with his general approach is a complicated question. We conclude by arguing for urgency of the discussion of the political ideas that mediate between the universal and the local values and identities – a task for which Abe’s legacy appears to us to be particularly relevant.