In the modern world, primarily in developed countries, education has become the main factor of intergenerational social mobility. Sociologists judge the degree of openness or rigidity of the social structure by whether the inÀuence of “birth circumstances” on access to education increases or, conversely, softens. Although higher education has become widespread in Japan by now, this does not mean that the degree of social inequality in this area has decreased. Structuring children’s chances of access to higher education along the lines dividing society into diɣerent social strata begins here at the stage of schooling – ¿rst, in lower secondary school, and then in upper secondary school. The inequality of chances that forms at the stage of school education aɣects the choice of university rank and directions of specialization by children and their parents, employment opportunities in the future, determining, in fact, the entire life path of a person. Based on the works of famous Japanese sociologists and the data of Japanese statistics, the author shows that the Japanese education system plays a dual role. On the one hand, it provides a chance to break away from one’s social roots and move up the social ladder to an increasing number of young people. On the other hand, it preserves and reproduces social inequality. According to calculations by Japanese sociologists, indicators of relative social mobility, reÀecting the ratio of chances to access higher education for people from diɣerent backgrounds, were remarkably stable throughout the post-war period. On the one hand, this does not con¿rm the widely accepted thesis about the growing inequality in education in the last two or three decades. On the other hand, it allows us to assert that both before and now Japanese society is a kakusa shakai, or a gap society. However, the increase of the share of second-generation university degree holders in the structure of Japanese university graduates suggests that the scale of the inÀuence of the factor of social inequality in education will gradually decrease.
The article is devoted to identi¿cation of similarities and diɣerences in the historical memory of Japan and the Federal Republic of Germany after World War II. These issues are a relevant topic for research in the face of the enduring inÀuence of historical grievances on Japan’s relations with its former victims, in contrast to similar relations of Germany. As a theoretical framework, the paper uses O. Malinova’s approach, which interprets historical memory as a product of social construction and a variation of symbolic politics. In addition, the author uses the classi¿cation of historical memory proposed by Matteo Dian. In the scope of the study, the author examines the impact of occupation policies on the further development of historical memory in the two countries. The paper compares the original content of the main narratives of historical memory in each country, the main mnemonic actors promoting them, and the evolution of these narratives from the end of the war to the present day. The author also highlights the reasons for the diɣerences in the content and evolution of the narratives in Japan and the FRG. The author concludes that, despite a certain similarity of the occupation policy in the two countries, as well as the formation of two traditions (conservative and left-progressive) in each country’s historical memory, its content and evolution are substantially diɣerent. In the FRG, the conservative tradition initially included the narratives of self-victimhood and amnesia, while the progressive tradition included the narrative of contrition; over the years however, the traditions have evolved from polarization to a consensus around contrition and elements of self-victimhood. In Japan, the conservative tradition initially included glori¿cation of the past in addition to self-victimhood, i. e., it was more revisionist, while the progressive tradition focused on self-victimhood rather than contrition. Over time, the traditions in Japan shifted from a consensus around self-victimhood to a sharp polarization: progressives moved to a contrition narrative, while revisionists gained ground among conservatives
In Japan, there are many regional legends and traditions associated with water, ¿sh, and fantastic creatures inhabiting the sea. These legends go back many centuries; the ¿rst mentions of large ¿sh are found already in the ¿rst Japanese poetic anthology Man’yōshū (8th century) and in the mythological and chronicle text Nihon Shoki (720). In diɣerent provinces, legends and traditions vary, some motifs are interpreted diɣerently by folklorists, however. Evidently, we can talk about a single body of related texts, united not only by plots where the main characters are whales, dolphins, etc., but also by accompanying actions: matsuri festivals in honor of ¿sh and ¿shing, ritual performance of magical texts, dancing, songs, cooking, making amulets, etc. The symbolism that unites the theme of ¿sh and ¿shing in Chinese and Japanese culture is also obvious: wealth and prosperity, which is reÀected not only in written monuments, but also in works of art. Whales, for example, are associated with numerous legends, traditions, and mythological motifs of local signi¿cance, ideas about these mammals as deities of the sea, to whom Shinto shrines are dedicated. Images of ¿sh were part of oɣerings to the bride’s family due to the auspicious meaning of the item. It is noteworthy that the legends about the sea included famous literary and legendary characters and episodes from famous works of Japanese history and literature, such as Kojiki, Nihon Shoki, Man’yōshū, Heike Monogatari