The global energy crisis of 2021—2022 significantly impacted the financial markets of many countries. The shock of price volatility in the oil and gas market triggered the transmission of crisis processes across various European countries, including those in the Baltic Sea region. This article analyses the effects of the energy crisis on these countries using the financial contagion methodology. The study aimed to estimate the financial contagion that spread through stock market channels in the Baltic Sea region during 2021—2022, as well as to systematize measures aimed at mitigating the consequences of the energy crisis and countering financial contagion. Using statistical analysis methods, the current state of the energy market in the Baltic region and its response to the conflict between Russia and Ukraine were examined. By reviewing a range of publications on the Baltic countries, evidence of financial contagion that emerged in different years under the influence of various shocks was identified. The financial contagion methodology was implemented by constructing DCC-GARCH models and estimating contagion effects using specialized test statistics. The calculations revealed that the energy crisis led to financial contagion in the markets of most Baltic Sea region countries. The study identified the causes of these countries’ vulnerability to financial contagion and provided additional estimates of contagion from a sectoral perspective. This allowed for conclusions to be drawn regarding the resilience of individual economic sectors to the crisis. The varying degrees of exposure to financial contagion were explained by differences in dependence on external energy supplies and the nature of anti-crisis policies. The paper systematized a set of specific anti-crisis measures for households and businesses in the Baltic Sea region and outlined strategies for countering financial contagion.
The article presents an analysis of contemporary British military-political strategy in the Baltic region. Since 2014, there has been a notable increase in British presence in the area, leading to multiple security risks for Russia, particularly since 2022. This is due to the fact that the UK has increasingly linked its national security threats to Russia’s policy towards Ukraine, as well as in the Black Sea and Baltic regions. By focusing on Russia’s positions in the Baltic and Black Sea regions, the UK has defined its security priorities, explicitly connecting them to countering “threats from Russia and preventing Russia from gaining strategic advantages as a result of the situation in Ukraine,” as clearly stated in the 2023 Security Review. It is no coincidence that British military strategists have started emphasizing the interconnectedness of the Baltic and Black Sea regions, as well as the Baltic and Arctic regions, highlighting the necessity of ensuring security in one part by addressing security challenges in others — primarily by limiting Russia’s influence. Through an analysis of key British security documents within the framework of the regional security complex theory, the author demonstrates how the Baltic Sea region has become a crucial link for British military strategists, connecting the Far North and Eastern Europe. The aim of the article is to determine how the UK’s security interests are connected to and pursued through its interactions with the Baltic Sea region countries. To achieve this, the following research objectives have been set: to analyse the conceptual and strategic goals of the UK in the field of security and the implementation of its national interests; to outline the role and significance of the Baltic Sea region within the UK’s broader international security strategy; and to identify specific tactical approaches employed by the UK to advance its national interests through cooperation with NATO countries in the region